

SECULAR STATE FOR INDIA

THOUGHTS ON INDIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE

DR. LANKA SUNDARAM, M.A., PH.D. (LONDON)

sometime Scholar of the Hague Academy of International
Law and Collaborator of the League of Nations; For-
merly of the Department of Politics and Economics,
Andhra University; Editor, **COMMERCE &
INDUSTRY**, New Delhi; Author of *India
in World Politics*; *Nationalism and Self-
Sufficiency*; *Indians Overseas etc., etc.*

RAJKAMAL PUBLICATIONS
DELHI
1944

CONTENTS

BOOK I	THE SWORD OF RELIGION	1—72
BOOK II	THE CITADEL OF CITIZENSHIP	73—114
	<i>Supplement: Photostat reproduction of Maulana</i>	
	Mohamed Ali's Last Political Testament	1—viii

BOOK I

THE SWORD OF RELIGION

Patriotism without a country is worse than slavery with one, and patriotism which is dominated by religion is useless tinsel. At a time of high expectation about our political and economic future, there can only be one attitude to the established Church of the British Government in India, the Hindu *Devasthanas* and the Muslim *Wakfs*. These are institutions of History, towards which the citizen of a State can only have reverent indifference. The divorcing of religion from politics and citizenship, though King Amanullah failed to achieve it in his time if the Ataturk ordained it successfully for Turkey, is a goal which every Indian patriot must strive for, whether it is a federation or a confederation that is to be established in this country. The "spiritualisation of politics" in terms of the enthrone-ment of citizenship as the first article of faith for the individual and the State, and the preservation of religion as the citadel of relationship between man and his Maker, are such objectives of importance for the individual and the community, which the political failure of the Roman Catholic Church, the Holy Roman Empire, the Muslim *jihad*, Sankaracharya's spiritual campaign, and a host of other historical developments have demonstrated. The secularisation of the foundations of the State, in

A SECULAR STATE FOR INDIA

terms of the Fundamental Rights Resolution of the Karachi Session of the Indian National Congress, coupled with the Fourteen Points of the All-India Muslim League, with the preservation of individual religion, language and culture, is the only guarantee of the survival of India as an integral State and polity, in which all communities with special interests are to have their appropriate weightage.

If I have one single duty in this country to discharge as a self-respecting individual, it is to secure the demise of theocracy and the dawn of a political State, which fits me and my fellow-countrymen to the task of discharging the rights of citizenship which are to endure the test of time. If the history of the world yields any lesson of a lasting character, it is that religion cannot be mixed up with politics, if religion is to survive and if politics is to preserve unto any people their just rights and to make them strong and self-respecting. I am not interested here in one of the latest statements of Mr. M. A. Jinnah, in which he said that democracy is not suited to the genius of the Indian people, apparently the Muslim community in this country, and that the only salvation for India is the organisation of a series of communal States (*i.e.* States based upon the principle of religion) with undefined and undefinable guarantees concerning their formation and survival. I concede the point that on October 14, 1944, Mr. Jinnah, for the first time in his *Pakistanite* career, told the *Daily Worker* of London that *Pakistan* is to be a democratic form of governance, as a prelude to his

renewed offensive against the community and the country, in the wake of the failure of his talks with Gandhiji. But I am not concerned with the possible future political and constitutional implications of *Pakistan*, if at all *Pakistan* is to come to us, which I believe will not be the case within my lifetime at least, even though Mr. Jinnah and his principal adherents have very cleverly, but with an ingenuity which will not stand the test of rational scrutiny, left undefined whether *Pakistan* will be democratic or authoritarian in the strict context of the medieval Islamic concepts of *millat*, *jihad* and *dar-ul-Islam*. I am definitely concerned here, however, with the essence of history as known to the people the world over, which only goes to show that religion had better be the cherished equation between man and his Maker and not be mixed up with politics, if politics, as I have said, is to ennoble a people and to preserve unto them as an inheritance the Mother Earth in the defined territories which goes to make up the world system. Four or five thousand years of the history of man have given us instances by the hundred, in which religion as a motive force for political organisation has been admitted to have come to grief. An examination in brief of the failure of this attempt of man to furbish the sword of religion as the basic foundation of State, must necessarily take the form of an analysis of the British Established Church, the Hindu conceptions of statecraft and the Muslim approach to the organisation of society and politics, and is attempted below.

Pax Romana ruled in its time the rest of the

world with the sword of religion behind it. And *Pax Britannica* lauds the Christian ethic as the basic foundation of human civilization, which keeps in step with Christian Imperialism. The ESTABLISHED CHURCH one had crumbled into the dust, and was consigned to the womb of the past. The other is to meet its Calvary in the future, which I trust will not be beyond my time. Nurtured in the traditions of Anglo-Roman jurisprudence, as I am, even as hundreds and thousands of intellectuals and public men in this country are, there is only one lesson which history right through the ages can teach us all, as represented by slavery, disintegration, and freedom. An examination must be made here of the manner in which the Roman Catholic Church got mixed up with the State, in a futile attempt to sustain politics with the sword of religion.

From the ministrations of St. Paul, to the abolition, or rather the disappearance, of the Holy Roman Empire, was one long, chequered strip of world history, in which the sword of religion not only protected the State, but also governed the laws of citizenship, in which the State failed to wean itself away from the Church. It is historically correct to say that denominational religion, supported by the trappings of institutionalism, had always, at any rate during the initial stages of the spread of religion, depended upon the sword for its propagation. Odin and Thor of the Teutonic countries had been decapitated by the onward march of the sword behind the Roman Catholic Church, which

the Romans took with them in their Imperialistic exploits of the early centuries of the Christian era. It is also historically correct to say that the downward plunge of Romanism, despite the sustained conspiracy of Roman soldiers and the Catholic Church, as a consequence of the unqualified rejection by the Anglicans of the futility of the Papal idea, led to the emergence of the British Primate as the spiritual leader of the vast majority of Britons during five centuries.

What I am trying to establish here is the fact that despite the adherence to ritualistic forms concerning the King and the Crown, which are anachronisms surviving from the Middle Ages, British polity today is secular in the extreme, and has nothing to do with religion as such being the foundation and motive force of politics. The Anglican sacrament comes into the picture when the cry goes up in England from time to time, "The King is dead, long live the King", but the sword of the Church is not behind any slogan of this character which, on an impartial examination, only means a hoary ritualistic form which the average Briton cannot see his way to depart from. The Roman Catholic Church in England is not an insignificant body, though the Catholic Archbishop of Westminster has not the status and function which the British Primate has with reference to the State, but derives his power and position only from the Pope who lives secure in his Vatican in distant Rome. It is obvious that, even as against the current forms of Anglican tradition in Britain, there

are instances of Roman Catholics becoming Lords Chief Justice of the Realm and other high functionaries of the State, a thing which is unthinkable in any country where the State finds its basis in religion proper. If a *Caliphate* is again to become evangelical in favour of international Islam, it is unthinkable that a *Khoja* or *Shia* would either become its vicegerent or law interpreter, but such a thing is possible in the established Church of England, which only goes to show that religion as the sword of State is neither militant, nor powerful, as the case was in the medieval times.

An examination must be made here of the implications of the Established Church in Britain and in the countries belonging to the British Empire and the Commonwealth. The Roman Catholic Church which was sought to be established in the wake of and as an adjunct to the Roman invasion of Britain, ever since the Pagan slaves of East Anglia were presented to the Pope in Rome, had not served its purpose as the enduring basis for the organisation of the State even in that small country. One need not delve into the great mass of contemporary literature in the Tudor Period, to show that the revolt against the Romanism of the Pope and of the Papacy of Rome, as also against the Established Church, was for securing their elimination as the principal religious pillars of the State in Britain. But, it is clear that King Henry VIII and his eight wives, and the conflict concerning the dispensation regarding the marriage of one, were not responsible for the destruction of Papacy as the sword behind the State. The

elimination of the Roman Catholic Church as one of the basic foundations of the polity of Britain, is a clear illustration of the futility of the sword of religion attempting to support the polity of a people, though I do not deny the existence even today of the Established Church, which was more or less responsible for the abdication of King Edward VIII as the monarch of England, on the score that a reigning sovereign could not, in terms of Anglican ritual, marry a divorcee. But these are not arguments to show that religion backs up the State in England today, to the extent possible and even deemed necessary during the time of Papacy.

There is still the Established Church in England, which is linked up with the State on perhaps the flimsiest possible type of relationship, but the onslaught of the religion of the Pope, as a measure of his temporal Power, has been consistently resisted in Britain, as a reflex effect of the militant evangelical approach which the Christian theocracy sought to exploit as a link between the North and the South and the East and the West under the aegis of Rome. The temporal power of the Pope was substantial in the earlier days of Roman Catholicism, and certainly subsists with reference to the continued existence of the Vatican State even today. The existence of the Vatican, however, is only one modern example of the efforts of religion to cling to temporal power on a small symbolical scale, so that the conversion of the Pagans to the "divine religion" might get merged into a territorial polity, without inspiring the fear of the world. But a single

Vatican cannot mean the emergence of a theocratic State, which is to evoke enthusiasm among modern political societies.

I am not concerned here with the religious wars of Byzantium, which were only the sectional wars inside Christendom, but any true appreciation of these minor sectarian conflicts inside the major denominational religions in the world, only establishes the point that the early efforts of any new religion to stabilise itself always ended up with temporal establishments, represented by theocratic States, which collapsed at the first wafting of an unfriendly breath. The rapid progress and the territorial pursuits of early Christianity ultimately yielded up the futile endeavours of the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy, and the Inquisition to stem the tide of non-conforming Protestant revolt, directly against the Roman Catholic State, in a manner which ultimately led to the destruction of the Church-cum-State, which was sought to be organised by Roman Catholicism as the only bulwark capable of ensuring its preservation from external attack. The Christian Crusades against militant Islam of a later era supply us with conflicting glimpses of a remarkably unified effort on the part of Christendom (comprising a series of nationalities and races with distinctive characteristics) to liberate the Holy Land, and to establish something like the Christian international mandate of polity, which was calculated to create and preserve a religious, State far more potent and real than the temporal trappings of the State which the Pope surrounds himself with today. But the failure of

the Christian Crusades to achieve this object is one of the gravest warnings of History against any supine effort of religion-intoxicated people to establish a theocratic State, obviously ostensibly for the glorification of God and His Church (in the widest connotation of the term), but actually as a physical, military and political prop to their denominational religion, which they seek to preserve against the valiant attacks from without of similar denominational religions of people who do not see eye to eye with them. Today it is the reverse of the early Christian Crusades against Islam, and the Balfour Declaration is pitting itself against Arab nationalism, under which it is not the Christian but the Jew who has to find a national home, meaning thereby a political State supported by religion in the Holy Land of Christ. I am not sure whether the Jewish national home in Palestine will ever succeed in becoming an actuality and, if it ever becomes an actuality, whether international Jewry will become a sovereign political State, without any reference to the continued existence of the British bayonets to support it, though I know that Premier Nahas Pasha was deprived of his office in Egypt to appease the British Imperialists who have no patience with the Pan-Islamic Conference he had recently organised. It is a curious commentary on the strivings of man through the ages, that he does not reckon with the moral of History, and that he elects to continue with his futile quest towards the establishment of a religious State, on foundations which really do not have even the least chance of survival.

The Established Church of England had been taken by the British to their Imperial possessions overseas, and even today the Indian tax-payer's money is partly utilised for the maintenance of the ecclesiastical establishments of the Government of India. I am afraid that these ecclesiastical establishments of the Government of India are bound to be with us, so long as the essential equation between India and England as *master and slave* exists, but it is clear that these ecclesiastical establishments which are financed from out of the public funds, especially for the benefit of the Christian servants of the Crown, do not constitute the Established Church of India. I need not here quote the solemn declaration of religious neutrality given by Queen Victoria at the time of her assumption of the Imperial Crown of India. Whether England consistently sought to set up one religious community against another to ensure her presence in our midst, or not, is beside the point of my argument here, but it must be admitted that, barring the religious establishments for the Christian servants of the Crown, there is no Established Church supporting British rule in this country, whatever might have been the results of the indecent haste with which the original soldiers and functionaries of John Company, and even the later British proconsuls, sought to claim the adherence of Hindus and Muslims, even at the risk of committing fraud, to Christianity. There are Anglican and Roman Catholic chaplains maintained by the "Christian" Government of India, for the special benefit of their Christian servants, and this curiously

non-denominational adherence to Christianity by a State, whose monarch is an Anglican, only demonstrates the fact that the ecclesiastical establishments of the Government of India do not constitute the Established Church of the country.

I suppose England would have perished in India, if she had sought to make Christianity the basis of her sojourn in our midst. England had not come to us with any consistent crusading spirit. She had come to us and is struggling to be with us (or, perhaps, I should say, over us) with the purely economic motive of exploitation, and if she struggles on with the inconsiderable ecclesiastical establishments for the special benefit of the Christian servants of the Crown, I, for one, would not have any quarrel with her on this score. When once I succeed in getting terminated British domination over me, the Christian ecclesiastical establishments which are paid for from out of the public revenues would automatically cease; and European Christians in this country and the hundreds and thousands of my Indian Christian fellow citizens would have the guarantee of freedom of religious worship in the way they seek best to find their equation with their Maker, and there the matter ends so far as British polity and religion in our midst are concerned. The endowments, if any, of the Christian Church in India, would be preserved in tact, but there cannot be any question that in the future polity of the country they would be allowed to continue to constitute a charge upon public revenues.

Na-vishnu Prihvi Pathi is one of the oldest

definitions of statecraft according to the traditional Hindu concept of politics and society. The vicegerency of God on earth has been assumed and preserved as sacrosanct by ancient Hindu kings, at a time when the organisation of society was either pastoral or rural in character. The ancient Hindu kings have annexed unto themselves the attributes of God on Earth, presumably with the willing co-operation and acquiescence of the people who, at the period at which this type of statecraft and political organisation was predominant, believed more in the sanctity of the blood-tie than in the niceties of the equation which ought to subsist between man and society, man and country, and man and politics. Erudite treatises have been written by early Hindu thinkers on the essential bases of social and political organisation within the four corners of a territorial concept for the State, and whether one wades through *Sukraniti* or Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, or, for that matter any of the other ancient Hindu texts which have any bearing upon an examination of polity and State, including the relevant portions of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, one would come to the conclusion that statecraft, even within the meaning of the vicegerency of the king on Earth on behalf of God, had a definitely delimitable territorial basis.

If King Henry the VIII had obtained, through a curious trick of fortune, the title "Defender of the Faith" only in the XVI century, the early Hindu kings had for millennia before exercised their Divine Right as the protectors of religion and as the principal

exponents of the religious approach to the organisation of society and statecraft. The preservation of the caste system, which is the sum total of approach of man towards his fellowmen and towards God in the early days of Hinduism, had thus become the primary function of the king on earth in Hindu statecraft. These attributes of divinity, which Hindu kings fondly clung to in the historic period, had gone to make possible the deliberate organisation of polity and society under their leadership, obviously in principle at the point of the sword, on the basis that within closely defined territories the religion of the king, meaning thereby the religion of the people, had to be preserved intact with studied effort and zest.

There are recorded instances of the sword of religion being brandished by some of the ancient kings of India against non-conformity, and I cannot give a greater or more appropriate example than that of Emperor Asoka, who, having hacked his way through Brahmanical India and cried halt only after the holocaust of Kalinga, "unsheathed" again the incongruously merciful sword of Buddhism, to spread light and culture to the whole country and the rest of the world. I am not quite sure in my mind whether the historic ceremony of *Aswamedh*, even of the variety described in *Uttara Rama Charitra*, had anything to do with the sword of religion being used by the King concerned, in order to proclaim and re-establish conformity within and even without his dominions. If I am not mistaken, this picturesque ceremony had more a military than a religious

aspect, in the sense that the territories covered by the sacrificial horse were brought under the political suzerainty of the king, than under the religious domination of the State concerned. The idea and ideal of *Ram Raj* had persisted right through the ages even to the present day, as something to be approximated to in terms of a purely Hindu type of social organisation and territorial politics. But I would be sceptical in dogmatically asserting whether this *Ram Raj* had the sword of religion behind it, in order that non-conformists right through the ages were brought under the common flag of a religion, supported by the panoply of power and coercion represented by a political State.

The failure of Asoka's *jihad* against Brahmanical Hinduism had apparently taught a salutary lesson to the Hindu kings right through the Christian era, in order that they might not venture into a realm of religious politics which was militant and un-compromising. It is true that even in the XVIII century King Shivaji unsheathed the sword of religion, and was successful in upholding it on behalf of the Hindus (or *Hindudom* as Veer Savarkar would like to put it) against the merciless onslaught of proselytizing Islam in India at that period of our national history. But it would be cruelly wrong to suggest that King Shivaji organised a Hindu *jihad* against Islam. On the contrary, King Shivaji's approach was more or less in terms of a counter-*jihad*, or defensive war, against the activities of the Muslim conquerors of India to stamp out the idolatrous, infidel Hindu. That is to say, the Hindu revival in

Maharashtra, which at one time spread over the length and breadth of India as a whole, had nothing to do with the conversion of the *mlechch*, which in any case is theologically unthinkable in terms of the ancient fabric of Hinduism (despite isolated recorded instances of Greeks embracing Jainism) as a religion, way of life or social organisation, but was more a conscious effort to withstand the onslaught of the incoming Muslim hordes which, in the true traditions of Ghazni and Ghorî, had sworn to stamp out non-conformity (within the meaning of Islam) wherever it had existed.

At a later stage I will be showing the manner in which the Muslim *jihad*, instead of continuing to be aggressive in character became defensive in approach to the problems of society and organisation of the State, until it had completely vanished, at any rate in the XX century, as illustrated by the national histories of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and even Afghanistan. But, as far as what I venture to term the Hindu counter-*jihad* is concerned, it is clear that the motive was not aggressive, that the method of approach was certainly not territorially militant, in the sense that it did not go beyond the territorial confines of the country inhabited by the Hindus of the period concerned, and that it was purely a gigantic effort on the part of the Hindus to preserve their religion against the openly declared *jihad* of the Muslims of the aggressive type known to history not only in India, but also in the various parts of the world, spreading from Morocco to Korea, and from Saville to Bali right through the historic period.

The British Government of India have statutorily separated the Sikhs from the Hindus for purposes of communal determination and in the hoary traditions of *divide et impera*, but despite the thinness of the distinction between a Hindu Jat, a Sikh Jat and a Muslim Jat in the Punjab these days, it is obvious that a Sikh is a Hindu to the core, conforming to the basic principles of Hinduism, though pursuing an exclusive type of living and organisation as ordained by the ten Gurus and the *Granth Sahib*. The merciless persecution by the Muslim conquerors, between the XIV and XVIII centuries, compelled the Hindus of the Punjab to group themselves together into a militant band pledged to the support and preservation of Hindu culture, tradition, social organisation and, even for that matter, purity of blood. Anyone who has gone through Macauliffe's volumes on the Sikhs would marvel at the tenacity of purpose of these Hindu protestants in withstanding the onslaughts of the superiorly equipped Muslim conquerors and rulers during these centuries, and a *paean* of approbation would be bestowed upon this small but virile community, which is the flesh of the flesh and blood of the blood of the Hindus, for having succeeded in resisting their engulfment and total religious obliteration by the early Muslim conquerors of this land. Actually, the establishment of the Sikh Kingdom culminating in the sovereignty of King Ranjit Singh would be remembered in history as a glorious example of the fruits of self-discipline and self-effort which any group of people can achieve, provided they have the

motive force of religion behind their earthly activity. No one can say that the sword of religion unsheathed by the Sikhs against Muslim persecution was or even today is an aggressive instrument for the stamping out of non-conformity wherever it existed. The Sikh conflict with Muslim hordes which surrounded this small and virile community in the Punjab was necessarily a religious war, but it was not a religious war based upon the principle of *jihad*, meaning thereby the extermination of the non-conforming *mlechh*. On the contrary, it was a last-ditch stand of a motley crowd of heroic Hindus, inspired successfully by their ten Gurus, to band together four square against the merciless and sustained onslaughts of Islam, and it must be said to the credit of the Sikhs that even persecution, of the cruel type one does not meet elsewhere in the entire annals of history, was insufficient to stamp out their achievement in the realm of man's cherished equation with his Maker. No one outside Bedlam would suggest that the religious wars of the Sikhs, or the sword of religion unsheathed by the Sikhs, during the two or three centuries before the British occupation of this country, had anything to do with aggressiveness in religion. If I may vary the metaphor again, the Sikh religious wars were defensive wars, identical with the wars waged by King Shivaji, intended for securing the *preservation* and not the expansion of Hinduism at the expense of non-conformists surrounding Hinduism.

I can go on multiplying instances of this character to further demonstrate the point that the

sword of religion was never unsheathed in the socio-political or socio-military sense as, for example, early Islam and the Holy Roman Church contrived to bring about for a thousand years after the birth of Christ. The obvious explanation for this curious twist to the extra-territorial approach of Hinduism is a simple one. Hinduism does *not* believe in conversion, and I say this in the face of the evidence supplied by numerous protestant movements within the fold of Hinduism, which sprang up almost in a crusading spirit and endeavoured to dismember the main body of the Hindus into so many sects, creeds and socio-religious groups. The *Tantrik*, the *Vaishnavite*, the *Nastik* and a host of other forms had all sprung from out of the bosom of Hinduism, whose catholicity and universality are such that they are not placed outside the pale.

It is not my purpose here to paint in glorious colours the achievements of Hinduism, demonstrating its indestructibility, but I am mentioning these simply to show that for possibly five thousand years or more—from the primitive animism of the ancient Aryans so forcibly brought out in the *Rig Veda* to the present multi-pronged type of denominationalised and institutionalised religion, ranging from the highest systems of metaphysics known to the human mind to what the Muslim would perhaps call the sheer idolatry inside a Hindu temple today—Hinduism deliberately eschewed the need for conformity within its fold and always kept, in the military sense, sheathed the sword of religion, and preserved itself as a code of religion and a way of social organisation

in which dissidents had a place of their own, in a manner which has no parallel in the history of man's religion anywhere. Occasionally, a great religious leader like Sankaracharya undertook a crusade against irreligion, or non-religion within the fold of Hinduism, but even the crusade of Sankaracharya, which must be presumed to have been taken to almost every corner of India, had not the arms of Kings and free-booters which, for example, the crusades of the early Omayyads or the Holy Roman Church had, almost at the time when Sankaracharya himself lived and sought the fulfilment of his earthly mission as one of the truest exponents of the pristine principles of Hinduism.

Hindu history and tradition draw a distinction between *Dharma* and *Adharma Yuddh*, the justified and unjustifiable wars, as between two kings or kingdoms or peoples. The battle of Kurukshetra was one of the most eloquent illustrations of this distinction between right and wrong, the appropriate and the inappropriate, and the justified and the unjustifiable wars which were legion in the historic period. The principal epics of India, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* and, even for that matter, the *Bhagavata* give us numerous illustrations of the wars of the mere mortal Hindus against the *Asuras*, the *Rakshasas* and a host of other non-conforming elements surrounding the Hindu territories, against whom incessant battle was waged by the Hindu kings. A trite example of this type of approach to statecraft, inter-statal relations and social preservation is that of the successful Hindu wars against

Banasura, Narakasura and, even for that matter Ravana. Sometimes we find occasion for a group of Hindu kings banding themselves together and marching as a solid phalanx against these non-conforming elements surrounding their kingdoms and even surrounding the earth, whose declared purpose was always stated to be the stamping out of the Hindu *Dharma* and the spoliation of Hindu society. Sometimes we find mortal kings joining hands with the celestial *Devas* for the purpose of contriving the destruction of these, shall I say, non-mortal or sub-human non-conformists, who had sworn to bring about the destruction of the cardinal principles of Hinduism. These non-conforming elements were no doubt successfully destroyed in the so-called *Dharma Yudh* of the ancient Hindu kings, but the most important point to be remembered in this connection is that there was no conversion of these non-conforming,

ian or sub-human elements into the Hindu
iat is to say, whenever the religious war was
y the Hindus, even as the religious wars
ged by King Shivaji or King Ranjit Singh,
re specifically waged for the purpose of the
tion of the Hindu system of socio-religious
tion and polity against attacks from without,
for the purpose of conquering the world
oduing the non-conforming elements into
on into the fold of Hinduism. *Suddhi* and
tan might have become the expedients of
century Hindu India, against the accumulation
a thousand years of forcible conversion by Islam
a tenet of faith, but it would be hard even in an

allegorical sense, to discover a single instance, in the entire range of mythological and historical tradition of the Hindu, of a non-conformist being given the Hindu *Dharma* and taken into the Hindu fold.

I am not forgetting for a single moment the fact that ancient Hindu missionaries had crossed the Seven Seas, in order to carry the message of the liberalising and constructive influence of the Hindu *Dharma*. I have seen with my own eyes the vestiges of Hindu missionary enterprise in countries like Indo-China (*Kambhoj*), Siam and elsewhere through the length and breadth of South-East Asia, but this Hindu missionary enterprise of the ancient days had nothing to do with the sword of religion, in the sense that it was not a *jihad* against non-conformists or sub-human peoples wherever they existed, but that it carried light and culture and made them a votive offering at the altar of sublimated humanity, in order to lift it from the degrading conditions of non-religion or irreligion. I must, in parenthesis, refer to occasional conflicts between these newly formed Hindu settlements overseas and the lesser religions of the world, e. g., the colossal religious wars culminating in the architectural ruins of Angkor-wat in Cambodia, but this has nothing to do with any aggressive spirit of Hinduism proper, with reference to the relationship of man with man on earth, and of man with his Maker in heaven.

I must, however, take note here of the reflex effects of the concept of *Ram Raj* on the social character and the political conception of the State

under a typical Hindu *regime*. As I have said earlier, the basic approach of the State under a Hindu king was that of the maintenance by him of God's vicegerency on earth. Then there was the *chatur varna* (caste system) which had to be maintained as much as possible, both in terms of religion and socio-economic organisation, but with the essential qualification that non-conforming elements in the community were more or less given the widest possible scope to fend for themselves, should they choose such a precarious earthly career. Otherwise, we would not find within our midst the countless number of creeds and sects flourishing in happy isolationism, for what it is worth, I cannot imagine, for I definitely know, that forcible conversion to Hinduism ever was either a proposition for religion or for the State in ancient India, in so far as, I have said, conversion was obnoxious in terms of the essential Hindu ethic. It is quite conceivable that, when the early law-givers of Hinduism and its princely exponents found their activity spreading all over the country and, also possibly, beyond the territorial borders of this country, at a period of transition from a pastoral to, what may be termed in terms of modern parlance, a fixed social organisation, attempts might have been made to preach the basic principles of Hinduism to the animists and others at the dawn of civilization and history. But even here, as I have said, I do not think that Rama ever thought of giving his religion to the defeated Ravana and his community of sub-humans or non-humans, who, curiously enough,

were themselves perhaps the most ardent worshippers of Shiva, who is one of the Hindu Trinity, with the result that non-conformity to prevailing conceptions of Hindu approach to life and living, even in terms of the organisation of the State, had lost most of its meaning to the "conquering heroes" of Hinduism.

This does not, however, mean that the organisation of the State under Hinduism did not have something like a religious approach. It was the duty of the king to endow the Brahman with the earthly equipment, which is necessary for the preservation of the caste-approach to the organisation of society and the State, even though it will be seen that a puritanical Brahmanism, which is the equivalent to the idealistic Brahmanism of the *Vedas*, was based upon the twin theory of abstinence and renunciation—abstinence from headlong indulgence in ordinary human sensations, and renunciation of the earth and the earthly goods. It is a trifle difficult to distinguish between the endowments made to the village temple and the village priest by the king and the community, but the fact remains that the Hindu *devasthanas* of today have some *nexus* to alienation in perpetuity of the property of the State, which is the equivalent of being the property of the King, under a typical Hindu system of territorial politics. To the extent that Hindu religious endowments, whether they originated from the largesse of the King or of the community, form an institution, to which Islam offers an equivalent in its *Wakfs*, they are institutions of history

sword of religion was never unsheathed in the socio-political or socio-military sense as, for example, early Islam and the Holy Roman Church contrived to bring about for a thousand years after the birth of Christ. The obvious explanation for this curious twist to the extra-territorial approach of Hinduism is a simple one. Hinduism does *not* believe in conversion, and I say this in the face of the evidence supplied by numerous protestant movements within the fold of Hinduism, which sprang up almost in a crusading spirit and endeavoured to dismember the main body of the Hindus into so many sects, creeds and socio-religious groups. The *Tantrik*, the *Vaishnavite*, the *Nastik* and a host of other forms had all sprung from out of the bosom of Hinduism, whose catholicity and universality are such that they are not placed outside the pale.

It is not my purpose here to paint in glorious colours the achievements of Hinduism, demonstrating its indestructibility, but I am mentioning these simply to show that for possibly five thousand years or more—from the primitive animism of the ancient Aryans so forcibly brought out in the *Rig Veda* to the present multi-pronged type of denominationalised and institutionalised religion, ranging from the highest systems of metaphysics known to the human mind to what the Muslim would perhaps call the sheer idolatry inside a Hindu temple today—Hinduism deliberately eschewed the need for conformity within its fold and always kept, in the military sense, sheathed the sword of religion, and preserved itself as a code of religion and a way of social organisation

in which dissidents had a place of their own, in a manner which has no parallel in the history of man's religion anywhere. Occasionally, a great religious leader like Sankaracharya undertook a crusade against irreligion, or non-religion within the fold of Hinduism, but even the crusade of Sankaracharya, which must be presumed to have been taken to almost every corner of India, had not the arms of Kings and free-booters which, for example, the crusades of the early Omayyads or the Holy Roman Church had, almost at the time when Sankaracharya himself lived and sought the fulfilment of his earthly mission as one of the truest exponents of the pristine principles of Hinduism.

Hindu history and tradition draw a distinction between *Dharma* and *Adharma Yuddh*, the justified and unjustifiable wars, as between two kings or kingdoms or peoples. The battle of Kurukshetra was one of the most eloquent illustrations of this distinction between right and wrong, the appropriate and the inappropriate, and the justified and the unjustifiable wars which were legion in the historic period. The principal epics of India, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* and, even for that matter, the *Bhagavata* give us numerous illustrations of the wars of the mere mortal Hindus against the *Asuras*, the *Rakshasas* and a host of other non-conforming elements surrounding the Hindu territories, against whom incessant battle was waged by the Hindu kings. A trite example of this type of approach to statecraft, inter-statal relations and social preservation is that of the successful Hindu wars against

Banasura, Narakasura and, even for that matter Ravana. Sometimes we find occasion for a group of Hindu kings banding themselves together and marching as a solid phalanx against these non-conforming elements surrounding their kingdoms and even surrounding the earth, whose declared purpose was always stated to be the stamping out of the Hindu *Dharma* and the spoliation of Hindu society. Sometimes we find mortal kings joining hands with the celestial *Devas* for the purpose of contriving the destruction of these, shall I say, non-mortal or sub-human non-conformists, who had sworn to bring about the destruction of the cardinal principles of Hinduism. These non-conforming elements were no doubt successfully destroyed in the so-called *Dharma Yudh* of the ancient Hindu kings, but the most important point to be remembered in this connection is that there was no conversion of these non-conforming, non-human or sub-human elements into the Hindu fold. That is to say, whenever the religious war was waged by the Hindus, even as the religious wars were waged by King Shivaji or King Ranjit Singh, they were specifically waged for the purpose of the preservation of the Hindu system of socio-religious organisation and polity against attacks from without, and not for the purpose of conquering the world and subduing the non-conforming elements into immersion into the fold of Hinduism. *Suddhi* and *Sanghatan* might have become the expedients of XX century Hindu India, against the accumulation of a thousand years of forcible conversion by Islam as a tenet of faith, but it would be hard even in an

allegorical sense, to discover a single instance, in the entire range of mythological and historical tradition of the Hindu, of a non-conformist being given the Hindu *Dharma* and taken into the Hindu fold.

I am not forgetting for a single moment the fact that ancient Hindu missionaries had crossed the Seven Seas, in order to carry the message of the liberalising and constructive influence of the Hindu *Dharma*. I have seen with my own eyes the vestiges of Hindu missionary enterprise in countries like Indo-China (*Kambhoj*), Siam and elsewhere through the length and breadth of South-East Asia, but this Hindu missionary enterprise of the ancient days had nothing to do with the sword of religion, in the sense that it was not a *jihad* against non-conformists or sub-human peoples wherever they existed, but that it carried light and culture and made them a votive offering at the altar of sublimated humanity, in order to lift it from the degrading conditions of non-religion or irreligion. I must, in parenthesis, refer to occasional conflicts between these newly formed Hindu settlements overseas and the lesser religions of the world, e. g., the colossal religious wars culminating in the architectural ruins of Angkor-wat in Cambodia, but this has nothing to do with any aggressive spirit of Hinduism proper, with reference to the relationship of man with man on earth, and of man with his Maker in heaven.

I must, however, take note here of the reflex effects of the concept of *Ram Raj* on the social character and the political conception of the State

under a typical Hindu *regime*. As I have said earlier, the basic approach of the State under a Hindu king was that of the maintenance by him of God's vicegerency on earth. Then there was the *chatur varna* (-caste system) which had to be maintained as much as possible, both in terms of religion and socio-economic organisation, but with the essential qualification that non-conforming elements in the community were more or less given the widest possible scope to fend for themselves, should they choose such a precarious earthly career. Otherwise, we would not find within our midst the countless number of creeds and sects flourishing in happy isolationism, for what it is worth. I cannot imagine, for I definitely know, that forcible conversion to Hinduism ever was either a proposition for religion or for the State in ancient India, in so far as, I have said, conversion was obnoxious in terms of the essential Hindu ethic. It is quite conceivable that, when the early law-givers of Hinduism and its princely exponents found their activity spreading all over the country and, also possibly, beyond the territorial borders of this country, at a period of transition from a pastoral to, what may be termed in terms of modern parlance, a fixed social organisation, attempts might have been made to preach the basic principles of Hinduism to the animists and others at the dawn of civilization and history. But even here, as I have said, I do not think that Rama ever thought of giving his religion to the defeated Ravana and his community of sub-humans or non-humans, who, curiously enough,

were themselves perhaps the most ardent worshippers of Shiva, who is one of the Hindu Trinity, with the result that non-conformity to prevailing conceptions of Hindu approach to life and living, even in terms of the organisation of the State, had lost most of its meaning to the "conquering heroes" of Hinduism.

This does not, however, mean that the organisation of the State under Hinduism did not have something like a religious approach. It was the duty of the king to endow the Brahman with the earthly equipment, which is necessary for the preservation of the caste-approach to the organisation of society and the State, even though it will be seen that a puritanical Brahmanism, which is the equivalent to the idealistic Brahmanism of the *Vedas*, was based upon the twin theory of abstinence and renunciation—abstinence from headlong indulgence in ordinary human sensations, and renunciation of the earth and the earthly goods. It is a trifle difficult to distinguish between the endowments made to the village temple and the village priest by the king and the community, but the fact remains that the Hindu *devasthans* of today have some *nexus* to alienation in perpetuity of the property of the State, which is the equivalent of being the property of the King, under a typical Hindu system of territorial politics. To the extent that Hindu religious endowments, whether they originated from the largesse of the King or of the community, form an institution, to which Islam offers an equivalent in its *Wakfs*, they are institutions of history

towards which, as I have said earlier, the citizen of a State can only have reverent indifference.

It is also difficult for any honest Hindu to project his mind into the appropriate type of political State one would like to have today or tomorrow, without in some fashion or other securing, shall I say in modern legalistic form, the statutory recognition of these institutions of history. But, it is clear that, through thousands of years of historical development, even of the fully sovereign early type of Hindu socio-political organisation, tolerance towards non-conformists had been the primary and fundamental approach, with the result that there was never any undue or unjustified emphasis on religion being the approach to the State proper. What I am trying to drive at is that we never found, under the Hindu organisation of State, a situation similar to what the Muslim invaders of India had created, *e.g.*, collection of *jizia* (poll tax from infidel Hindus), forcible conversion to Islam, compelling the non-conformists at the point of the sword to eschew his vegetarianism and to eat beef, and a host of other crude but apparently very delectable approaches to what, shall I say, the early *Caliphs* sought to have in terms of the *millats* within their territories.

I have absolutely no desire to whitewash the crudities of the Hindu type of approach to social organisation and the polity of the community and the State, but I would not be true to myself, as a born Hindu with some pretensions to the knowledge of the sacerdotal forms of approach to religion and its

implications to the community, if I do not unhesitatingly emphasize the point that tolerance to non-conformity, which might range from eclecticism to atheism, has been the basic approach of Hinduism to the individual, the community and the State. If today there are certain historical anachronisms, *e.g.*, the *devasthans* and a fastly crumbling organisation of society on the basis of the caste system, the attitude of a patriotic Hindu towards them must necessarily be one of reverent indifference.

In my time, I have taken an intimate part in *Harijan* work, and for four years lived in the midst of *Harijans*, losing, as a penalty for this "crime", the right to the Hindu sacrament in the eyes of what I may term the obscurantist *pundits*, who parrot-like continue to repeat uncomprehended dry texts of ancient Hinduism, but I am convinced that this is not the approach to life and living today of the average Hindu. A decade ago, after the historic Poona Pact which saved Gandhiji's life, it was a period of high expectation about a complete reorganisation and reconstruction of Hindu society, and Mahatma Gandhi undertook on foot his *Harijan* tour of Orissa. It was his programme to get access to the Hindu temples and *devasthans* for the *Harijans* of the land, since they were endowed either by the king or by the community in a distant past, which cannot be ascertained with sufficient clarity these days. There were sanguinary incidents when some of the *savarna* (high caste) temples were approached by the so-called untouchables of the land, even though, at a later stage, a single procla-

mation of a Hindu prince had statutorily given them the right of entry to these institutions of history and hoary religion in the State of Travancore. I remember receiving, on behalf of the *Harijan* community of Vizagapatam, Mahatma Gandhi, after the completion of his Orissa tour ten years ago, and even today I vividly recall the almost unbelievable surprise of Mahatma Gandhi when it was arranged that he should open a beautiful temple built by the *Harijans* for themselves, for I believed, even at that time, the need for a change of heart, and that the highest of the high must go down to the level of the lowest of the low, if such had ever existed within the fold of Hinduism proper, in the communion of a common prayer to the Maker, that society be preserved in terms of harmony and fellowship. I am quite sure that the fellow Brahman who, like myself, had the courage to perform the religious ceremonies necessary for the formal opening of a Hindu temple for the *Harijans*, must have been thrown to the wolves by the Hindu pharisees, who are available unfortunately in our midst by the million even today. But the fact remains that I, as a self-respecting individual and a born high caste Hindu, meaning thereby the *vaidik* Brahman, would sooner have a *regime* of things in which I would descend to the levels of the lowest of the low (believe me, not with any sense of haughty condescension), than spoil for some sort of civil strife, simply because the so-called untouchable approaches, even with humility, these institutions of history and religion. But this is an

organisational question which I need not pursue here at any greater length.

I have said that Hinduism would not have survived the onslaughts from without of the most aggressive type, but for its catholicity and that undefinable something which gives it a vitality all its own, unmatched either in Christendom or Islam. A great Muslim divine, whose piety and skill are recognised even by the *Al-Azhar* University at Cairo, not to speak of Islam wherever it exists today, had attempted to give his considered opinion upon religion in our midst, and I cannot do better than quote this appraisal which, I am sure, every Hindu and Muslim in this country would endorse. This is what Maulana Abul Kalam Azad said: "It was India's historical destiny that many human races and cultures and religions should flow to her, finding a home in her hospitable soil, and that many caravans should rest here..... One of the last of these caravans, following the foot-steps of its predecessors, was that of the followers of Islam..... This led to a meeting of the culture currents of two different races: Like the Ganges and the Jumna, they flowed for a while through separate courses. But Nature's immutable law brought them together and joined them in a *sangam*. The thousand years of our joint life have moulded us into a common nationality. This cannot be done artificially. Nature does her fashioning through her hidden processes in the course of centuries. Whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No artificial scheming to separate and divide will break this unity."

Political considerations have led to the emergence of a mediæval type of religious approach to rear its head in our midst today, as the only basis for the Hindu and the Muslim to settle their differences, but this phase is now passing. But it is clear that the sword of religion behind Islam had long since ceased to be the motive force behind statecraft, in the same fashion in which the sword of religion behind Hinduism, when it first came into contact with what I have called the animism of the inhabitants of this country in a hoary past which is now almost shrouded in mystery, had vanished into thin air. It may be a trifle unpleasant for an Indian patriot to dig up the past of Islam, even only for the purpose of showing that the sword of religion had been sheathed and securely locked up for centuries together, even in the countries of the Holy Prophet (Peace be on Him) and of the Caliphs. But I must attempt such an analysis and appraisal with reference to the Islamic past, and with the assistance of indisputable authorities in the English language, for I have not that pretence to knowledge of the Arabic and the Persian texts which I might, with a sense of *faux-pas* in my idiotic moments, try to claim along with the countless numbers of *Pandits* and *Mullahs* in respect of Hinduism.

An appraisal of the early foundations of the Muslim State—whether it be under the Omayyads, the Ottomans or the Moguls—is appropriate in this place for our argument. From Baghdad
MUSLIM
JIHAD to Cordova, from Kabul to Imphal,
Muslim rule spread itself out in the historical

period with the crusading fervour of the *jihad*. From the Battle of the Pavements in France to the sack of Delhi by Ahmad Shah Abdali, it was one long and even sordid story of an attempt to secure the extermination of the *kaffir*, be he White or Brown, or in the alternative his forcible conversion to Islam, or his persecution.

But I pay my tribute to Islam, despite its medieval characteristics of a theocratic or religious state, for what it has given to the world and to me in terms of a highly organised system of medicine, mathematics and historiography, and for the manner in which it stood four square for long centuries, against the counter crusades of Christendom, until the emergence of European powers as maritime nations and the discovery of gunpowder as the principal achievement of Christian alchemy led to the ultimate political destruction of Constantinople and the gradual dismemberment of the Omayyad dynasty. Unless I am grossly mistaken, it would appear that triumphant Christianity had learnt its lesson from the failure of Islam to maintain a theocratic state and dominion over the conquered territories, which had at one time spread all over the Mediterranean littoral, whether it be Egypt, Morocco, Spain, France or even Italy. I believe it is the verdict of history that the failure of the Muslim *regime* of the *zimmi* or *kaffir* and of the crusades of Christendom against Islam is responsible for the elimination of religion as the principal adjunct to the evolution of the State, as conceived and maintained by the Western Imperial Powers which, at any rate during the past

three centuries following in the wake of the destruction of Islam as an international political power, had come to rule the world, but for the temporary interlude of the past three years represented by the Japanese occupation of South-East Asia, which claims millions of Muslims who live in complete isolation from their compeers in India and the Near East.

Coming nearer home, ever since the first Arab set his foot on the soil of Sind 1,200 years ago, till the fall of Bahadur Shah to the guns of the East India Company nearly two hundred years ago, there were one or two features of importance which I must notice. The long years of Ghazni and Ghorî and the sack of Somnath, conformed to the pristine tradition of the Muslim *jihad* and the extermination of the Hindu *kaffir* and his forms of worship, in order that the Muslim way of life was accepted by every living individual on the face of the earth. Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali represented the special type of Muslim buccaneers, who were out for the loot of the rich plains of Hindustan, though they were certainly good Muslims and genuinely believed that by their work they would be going to their pre-ordained Vallalah, if in the process of loot and destruction they also destroyed the *kaffir* and his religion, and claimed him, even at the point of the sword, to Islam. Let me now pause for a little while here to review the centuries of Mogul rule proper in our midst. Emphasis on the *kaffir-nexus* of the activities of the early Mogul rulers was there in unmistakable form, but the Moguls had come to

stay in India and, strangely enough, had stayed, with the result that the purity of Arab blood, as the concomitant of Islam, was no longer sought to be maintained, and intermarriages with *kaffirs* took place by the million, from the Emperor down to the rank and file of his freebooters and buccaneers. By the time Akbar became the Emperor of India, most of the Muslim established churches of the country were losing their momentum, and the organised State was coming gradually to the creed of such of the *kaffirs* themselves who were able to maintain their individuality and religion, despite the ever-pervading grip of the Muslim rulers. Akbar himself proclaimed his principle of religious neutrality which he had so eloquently enshrined in his creed *Din Ilahi*, and a *firman* issued by Emperor Aurangzeb (who is popularly misrepresented as the most notorious Hindu-baiter) is still extant which shows that this most puritanical Muslim Ruler of India respected Hindu sentiment and ordered the protection of the cow.*

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who is not a friend of the Hindus (*Thoughts on Pakistan*), premises that *Pakistan* and *Hindustan* had existed side by side in India during the twelve hundred years, from the time Mohammad Bin Qasim who conquered Sind in 712 A.D. There are in this book passages taken from contemporary Muslim evangelical literature, and I must emphasise the "evangelical" aspect of the adventures of the Tartars, the Afghans and the Moguls—the three main currents of Muslim invasion of India, which

* See my book *Cow Protection In India*, South Indian Humanitarian League, Madras, 1927.

Dr. Ambedkar postulates to terrify the present-day Indian out of his wits, and to demonstrate the efficacy of the *jihad* as practised by Ghazni, Ghorī, Aibak, Timur and Aurangzeb, which included infliction of slaughter, rape, the forcible conversion and spoliation of the economic status of Hindus by the invaders, who came and went during the chequered period of the long years of history represented by the so-called Muslim conquest of India. There is one curious passage in Dr. Ambedkar's book, which, however, knocks the bottom out of the entire basis of this argument about the predatory and punitive type of conquest and administration of India by the early Muslims. Here it is (pp. 50-51): "These invasions of India by Muslims were as much invasions of India, as they were wars among the Muslims themselves. This fact has remained hidden, because the invaders are all lumped together as Muslims without distinction. But as a matter of fact they were Tartars, Afghans and Moghuls. Mohammad Ghazni was a Tartar, Mohammad Ghorī was a Moghul, Timur was a Mongol, Babar was a Tartar, and Nadir Shah and Ahmadshah Abdali were Afghans. In invading India, the Afghan was out to destroy the Tartar, and the Mongol was out to destroy both the Tartar as well as the Afghan. They were not a loving family cemented by the feeling of Islamic brotherhood. They were deadly rivals of one another and their wars were often wars of mutual extermination." If this was the statement of one of the protagonists among non-Muslims of India in favour of the Two-Nation theory, it is a present

to the iconoclast *Pakistanites* in this country, and it is also an adverse testimony from one of their staunch admirers and supporters in their grand drive towards the dismemberment of this country. In fairness to Dr. Ambedkar, I must, however, quote the remaining three lines from the paragraph preserved above. He says: "What is, however, important to bear in mind is that with all their internecine conflicts, they were all united by one common objective, and that was to destroy the Hindu faith."

I have tried to wade through the four hundred pages of Dr. Ambedkar's book of diatribes and half-truths in order to find his basic conclusions. In one sentence he sums up his position (page 347): "It is true I have not given any finding." But any Indian reader going through this sustained attack upon the territorial and political integrity of India, can give the finding himself from the tables of statistics preserved by Dr. Ambedkar, whose scholarship and hard work cannot be impugned. According to him, the computation of Muslim population of Indian provinces is in the aggregate 25.9 per cent, and of Indian States, again in the aggregate, 12.7 per cent. These percentages vary from 1.09 in Orissa, to 73.7 in Sind, and from .01 per cent. in Sikkim to 97.5 per cent. in Baluchistan States. Dr. Ambedkar gives a series of maps naming the "Muslim" areas to the west and east of India. He marks thirteen districts of the present province of the Punjab as Hindu (he does not mention Sikhs at all in this connection). In regard to Bengal and Assam, he lists twenty-two districts of both the Provinces, which literally hem in the

fourteen Muslim districts in terms of a horse shoe, with three areas represented by feudatory States, for which he does not give any population composition. I have tried to obtain enlightenment from Dr. Ambedkar as to what he would do, or what the *Pakistanites* would do, with some of the Muslim States like Hyderabad in which the Muslim population is only 10.4 per cent. But, of course, it is a very inconvenient question, which neither Dr. Ambedkar, nor any of the fanatical Muslims who want their territorial share out of this country, can possibly care to answer.

Muhammad Asad, an Austrian convert to Islam, whom the late Allama Iqbal characterised as a very powerful thinker, says: "Islamic civilization is the most complete form of theocracy history has ever known" (*Islam at the Crossroads*, p. 31). He further says: ".....The very foundations of modern Western Civilization are incompatible with Islam. This should in no way preclude the possibility of Muslims receiving from the West certain impulses in the domain of exact and applied sciences; but their cultural relations should begin and end at that point. To go further, to imitate the Western Civilization in its spirit, its mode of life and its social organisation is impossible, without giving a vital blow to the very existence of Islam as a theocratic polity and practical religion" (*italics mine*) (p. 55).

Mohamed Abdullah Enan, Assistant Director, Press Department, Ministry of the Interior, Cairo, (*Decisive Moments in the History of Islam*), discussing the religious policy of the Arabs, clearly indicates

the early principles of Muslim *jihad*, including the forcible conversion of the *zimmi*s (non-Muslims, particularly of the Near East, Spain, etc.) and gives an eloquent account of long centuries of Islamic tradition of the earlier type, which believed in forcible conversion, and collection of *jizya* (tribute). He quotes one of the letters of the second Caliph Omar, under whose regime the political tenets of Islam were stated to be as follows: "The Zimmis must be sealed in the neck with lead; they must show their belts, shave their beards and ride their mounts aside. The *jizya* (tribute) is to be imposed only on those who are already shaved (adults); it must not be imposed on women or boys. The Zimmis are not allowed to dress themselves in the same manner as the Moslems" (p. 18). Earlier, Enan declares that "the non-Moslem peoples were always considered by Moslem society as inferior from the social point of view; in the fields of public life they were deprived of the protection, respect and pride which the Moslem enjoyed. This distinction dates from the early days of Islam; it was officially designed and laid down by state" (pp. 17-18).

But surveying the entire history of the phenomenal Muslim expansion in the West, including Spain, France and Italy, under the early Caliphs, particularly prior to the onrush of the Christian Crusades, Enan indicates the unmistakable manner in which the Caliphate system found itself beaten in its religious policy towards the *zimmi*s, and comes to the conclusion that the early evangelistic and even militant religious approach of the Omayyads

gradually gave place to a regime of toleration towards non-conformists. There is, however, this curious passage in Enan's survey: "Thus, this peaceful and enlightened policy, adopted by the Governments of the Caliphs towards its new subjects, led at first to gaining their support through religious tolerance, and their material help through payment of tribute, and then at last to their embracing Islam and thus securing their moral and material support at the same time. Thus, it appears that the spread of Islam with this overwhelming rapidity was not always in conformity with the policy of the Caliphate and that it was, at one time, prejudicial to its material interests. This throws light on an astounding historical fact denied or misrepresented by most of the western writers who write on Islam, and on the methods of its diffusion and the causes of its being so deeply rooted; it also explains how the Government of the Caliphs was, at the same time, an autocracy grasping all authority in its hands and a lenient instrument which gave way to liberal and democratic principles [sic]" (pp. 25-26).

The Wahabi Movement, which started early in the XIX century in this country as one of the puritanical developments of thought in Islam, was a tremendous force in modern political Islam in our midst. W. Cantwell Smith writes (*Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis*). "In the revolt against the Sikhs in the Punjab, and in the various uprisings against the British there and in Bengal, they proclaimed a *jihad* against the infidel, and appealed not only to the oppressed to unite against their exploiters, but to

the Muslims to unite for the defence of their religion. *None of these political activities, however, was anti-Hindu.*" (*italics mine*) (p. 189).

W. W. Hunter in his sympathetic book '*The Indian Mussalmans*' (p. 107), referring to the Wahabi uprising around Calcutta in 1831, states that they "broke into the houses of Muslim and Hindu landlords with perfect impartiality". He indicates, however, that the upper class Muslims opposed these peasant rioters in search of an *egalitarian* society, with the result that the *fatwas* of the Muslim divines were directed against them for long decades. This is what Cantwell Smith writes (pp. 189-190). "The Wahabi Movement, therefore, did not set lower-class Muslims against lower class Hindus in open conflict, nor did it divert lower class Muslims from economic issues to a false solidarity with their communal friends but class enemies. Nonetheless, it did encourage communal attitudes, especially in religious thinking, and left a considerable section of the Muslim masses more susceptible to later communist propaganda than they might otherwise have been. The Mutiny, like the political *jihads* of the Wahabis, emphasized the Muslim community of India as a religio-political unit, but at the same time emphasized co-operation between that community and the Hindus in the face of a common enemy."

Khuda Baksh (*Studies: Indian and Islamic*, p. 32) writing in 1912 in emphasis of the need for Indian unity exhorted the people: "May the Muslim solidarity—for purposes Indian—be merged into a higher, nobler Indian solidarity, mightily single". He

further says (*Essays: Indian and Islamic*, p. 20), that these principles have been lost sight of by Indian Muslims, and I have to reckon with a series of developments in our midst which have had such catastrophic results these days.

For any proper appraisal of the manner in which the earlier iconoclasm and militant religious basis of Islam in India had spent its force, and the Muslims settled down in the country to the cultivation of the arts of peace and stability and co-equal partnership with non-Muslims, in the sharing of the burdens of statehood or nationhood, an examination must be made here of the lasting influence of the life and work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement, represented by him, Wiquar-ul Mulk, Nazir Ahmed, Shibli and Hali. My comprehension of Urdu literature is severely handicapped, and I quote below from Dr. S. M. Abdullah's book entitled "*The Spirit and Substance of Urdu Prose under the Influence of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan*," to which the late Allama Iqbal wrote an appreciative foreword. I believe my Muslim friends in India would not dispute the authenticity of the quotations given below from this very important publication.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in his monumental publication "*Tafsir-ul-Quran*" "violently criticised the idea of *jihād* of an aggressive nature so commonly prevalent among the Muslims. According to him, all the wars fought by the Prophet of Islam were defensive, and there is no injunction in the Holy Quran favouring the popular view of *jihād*" (p. 29). Shibli in his "*Sirat'un-Nabi*" also emphasised this

point and declared that "all the wars fought by the Holy Prophet were defensive" (p.130). Nazir Ahmed in his book "*Huquq Wal-Faraid*" stated: "the conditions necessitating such a war (*jihad*) do not exist under the British Government" (p. 51).

Shibli Numani answering in the affirmative the question whether Islam can exist in the face of the present advancement of science and civilization, is stated to have affirmed that Islam ensures "absolute cultural autonomy for religious minorities in a Muslim state, in so far as they do not interfere with existing law and order", (p. 60).

The progressive invasion of racialism over Islam is, however, indicated by the following passages relating to Sir Syed: "his interest in the international political movement, 'pan-Islamism', was intensified and, last of all, his experience and knowledge of other countries further stimulated in him the desire to revive modern Islamic society on a broader and a more rational basis" (p. 110). Shibli in "*Ilm'ul-Kalam*", answering the question why there were so many classes in Islam, "traces the causes of this, one of which was the dominating influence of Politics over Thought"(p. 57). Tracing the evolution of the ideas of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, particularly as a consequence of the development of his mind resulting from his visit to London in 1869 and the Aligarh Movement in general, Dr. Abdullah says that "while he sympathised with Indian aspirations, he seceded from the Indian National Congress and exhorted his co-religionists to remain aloof from its activities. He was a liberal politician, but above all

he was interested in the education of his own community. To achieve this, the *most cordial relations with the Government were considered essential*. (*italics mine*) (p. 19).

The late Sir Mohammad Iqbal, according to Cantwell Smith (*Modern Islam in India—A Social Analysis*, p. 12) "looked upon aggressive warfare as one of the horrors of modern civilization, and he criticized land-hungry *jihād* even in Islam. He used to say that the greatest misfortune of Islam was when it became an Empire."

Iqbal's abhorrence of the then prevailing "pathetic piety" of the people is summed up in the following exhortation of his: "Go and fight, commands the Quran. Fight the devil in your bosom first.....and fight the evil outside.....Fight the devil of dirt and uncleanness in your surroundings, fight the devils of disease and poverty, fight malaria, fight plague, fight cholera, fight ignorance and illiteracy, fight the fat capitalist who defrauds and exploits the poor, fight the religious hypocrite who cheats the people under his cloak of piety, fight those who deprive you of your birthright of free manhood" (*ibid* p. 130).

Islam in India, during the past hundred years in particular, had to discharge the twin task of modernisation and reconstruction internally, and to link up with contemporaneous religious movements in the world, in other words, with pan-Islamism. I have already referred to the efforts of a century of the Wahabi Movement, in the course of which we have seen the ruthless manner in which the vested interests of orthodox theological leaders and the rich

among the Muslim community in the country attempted to thwart any horizontal integration of Indian Muslim society. I have already adverted to the manner in which the Aligarh School of Islamic thought tried to infuse racialism into the ethics and polity of Indian Islam, in order that Muslims in this country get their roots firmly implanted into the earth and, as a corollary, to retrieve the position they had lost at the time of the British conquests of the country, whether it be in the field of economic rehabilitation, political consciousness or cultural progress.

I am not here concerned with the insidious efforts of the British rulers of the country to divide the ranks of nationalist forces available to us, whether it be in respect of the efforts of Lord Minto at the dawn of the present century or of Lord Chelmsford at the conclusion of the last Great War, who artificially sought to put up "stooges" as propounders of the separatist political movement in this country in favour of the Muslim interests as distinct from those of India as a whole. But any one who knows the green-room tactics at the time of the Minto-Morley reforms and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of the present century would readily recognise that Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan and his Aligarh Movement were not only inspired and financed but also controlled by the Government of India and their agents, but were the lineal predecessors of His Highness the Aga Khan and others. The manner in which our British masters have succeeded in keeping up this separatist agitation in India on the part of certain

Muslims, mostly through a horrible system of political spoils, has been kept up right through the course of the last quarter of a century, and including the rigmarole connected with the Simon Commission, the Round Table Conference and the Joint Select Committee, leading to the passing of the Constitution Act of 1935. Until the Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim League in 1940, when *Pakistan* became an integral creed of Muslim League politics, even the moderate Muslims of the country, who looked more to Government patronage than to loyalty of their co-religionists and the goodwill of their fellow subjects of other countries resident in the land, got disillusioned to such an extent, that today the sense of frustration, which has crippled the activities of the Indian nationalists during the past half a century, also came to invade the activities of the Muslim title seekers and job hunters, alongside of their Hindu compeers. When the history of modern times comes to be written, the verdict will be given that even *Quide Azam* Jinnah was influenced by the politics of *divide et impera* pursued by the authorities, but this is not a tract on Muslim League politics, with the result that I must proceed with an empirical examination of the evolution of the ideas of Muslim politics based on religion in this country.

The other twin aspect of the reconstructional activities of modern Islam in India is represented by the *pan-Islamic* approach of its leaders, as an escape from the realities of the loss of freedom, which emanated from the British succession to Muslim Emperors of the land. It is one of the most curious developments

of modern political thought and activity that Indian Muslims had come to recognise the need for considering themselves as the custodians of the fortunes of Islam outside India. There was the classic example of the oratory of that tub-thumper, Mr. Jamnadas Mehta, who today is the representative of the Government of India accredited to the *emigre* Government of Burma in Simla, when he cried hoarse in trying to convince the world that at the time of the *Khilafat* Movement twenty-five years ago in this country, both Gandhiji and the Ali Brothers invited ex-King Amanullah to invade our homes. Only lunatics in this country can believe a proposition like this, for the simple reason that the resources of ex-King Amanullah to invade India and to eject the British from out of our midst were too puny to be effective.

Pan-Islamism, however, continues to be one of the most profound influences affecting the political activity of Indian Mussalmans, despite the repeated rebuffs they have received, sometimes from their own co-religionists abroad, for example, from the late Atatürk; and consistently from His Majesty's Government during the fateful years of the inter-war period and up to the present day. I consider a short review of the origin and growth of the *pan-Islamic* movement and the futility attending upon the urge for external expression, before obtaining internal strength, on the part of certain sections of the Muslim community in this land, will serve a very useful purpose, that is to say, in the building up of the foundations of a secular State in this country, in

which the Hindu and the Muslim can co-operate towards securing the common task of liberating the Mother Country and towards establishing her position in the world of politics of tomorrow.

To the evolution of Islamic thought in India during the past half a century, Sir Mohammed Iqbal's contribution must be considered to be particularly important. This Indian poet of Islam has gone through varying moods and ideas before he arrived at the goal of *Pakistan* as a central concept of Muslim religio-politics in this country. The sense of frustration which the Indian Muslims came to feel during the fateful years marking the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, both on account of an assault from without and the assault from within, was the cause of this poesy of frustration, so eloquently illustrated by the *Shikwa* and *Jawab-i-Shikwa* of Allama Iqbal. The ideas of *jihad* and *zimmis* continue to hold that fascination which early Muslim crusaders and buccaneers possessed, but, if I do not do injustice to the memory of the late Allama Iqbal, these aggressive chantings of religious poetry really intended to take the Indian Muslim back to the hoary days of triumphant international Islam, which today, however, cannot be revived with all its unsullied glory.

Allama Iqbal begins his *Shikwa* with

".....'tis none but God Himself
whom I, in sorrow, must arraign!"
(1-3)

Iqbal's arraignment takes the form of a recapitulation of the former triumphs of Islam in the West and

**"It was the might of Muslim arms
Fulfilled Thy task and gave them Light."**

(IV-3)

“But which among these nations raised
The sacred sword in holy fight,
Self-consecrated to Thy cause,
To set their crazy world aright?”

(V-3)

"Beneath the shade of blades unsheathed
In Kalima we glory sought."

(VI-3)

"Who smashed to dust man's hand-wrought

Those things of straw and earth and clay?
And who did unbelieving hosts
To spread Thy name and glory slay?"

(IX-2)

“Among those nations, was there one
Who craved Thee as we craved and sought ?
Or risked the perils of fell war
That Thy Divinest will be wrought ?”

(X-1)

Allama Iqbal's mind moves on from this recapitulation of the past glories of Islam to an arraignment of God who, he says, has forsaken Mussalmans, particularly Indian Mussalmans. Here are a few more stanzas from his *Shikwa*, indicating this approach of his mind.

“Yet see how still Thy bounties rain
On roofs of unbelieving clans,